He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? Drinski did most of the talking. It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). 3. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Drinski did most of the talking. 1994). 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. Id. 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. ZAGEL, District Judge. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. 2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. Our answer is, and has been no, because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. Perras took the poker. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. 34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. My life isn't worth anything." We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. 1988) (en banc) . At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. Oklahoma County Board, 151 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. My life isn't worth anything." Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Vinyard v. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. The details matter here, so we recite them. Plakas was turned on his back. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. at 1276, n.8. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. So we carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). United States Court of Appeals . It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. 1992). Circumstances can alter cases. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. Mailed notice(cdh, ) Download PDF . Alfredia Edwards as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Edwards v. Officer John Doe et al, Thomas Leiter v. Joseph Bumbaugh and Town of Winona Lake, Favela v. Las Cruces Police Department et al. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. Rptr. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. 1983 against Drinski and Newton County to recover damages in connection with her son's death. Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Again, he struck her. The district judge disagreed and granted summary judgment, 811 F. Supp. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 104 L. Ed. The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. He appeared to be blacking out. Filing 920070312 In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. et al. This guiding principle does not fit well here. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. ", Bidirectional search: in armed robbery These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources . Get free summaries of new Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. 1994). This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. 2d 443 (1989). We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. 1989). Plakas V. Drinski - Ebook written by . In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. It is from that point on that we Judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. accident), Expand root word by any number of The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. 2. In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 85 L. Ed. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Plakas often repeated these thoughts. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. Civ. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. 5. george v. morris, in which a ninth circuit panel concluded a police officer violated a clearly estab-lished constitutional right 17 7. a 13-year-old child is not an adult and the child's age is relevant to . After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one Conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. They called Plakas "Dino." . 1977). Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. French v. State, 273 Ind. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. In brief, after the officer stopped to help the man, his actions and his flight showed he was unhurt and may well have stolen the bike from which he fell. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. 2. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. Illinois. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. Code Ann. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. No. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. right or left of "armed robbery. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. Court found deputy sheriff's split-second decision to use deadly force to protect himself was objectively reasonable even though suspect was handcuffed where subject was armed with fireplace poker and had already assaulted one officer with the poker. Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. . defendant cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. No. 1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. She fired and missed. On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. Such that an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated the right. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. We believe the defendant misunderstands the holding in Plakas. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. 1992). Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). Plakas' mother, the Administratrix of his estate, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. Plakas was turned on his back. The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) -Similar decision to Scott v. Harris - firing 15 shots into a vehicle/the presence of a passenger did not amount to excessive force. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. They noticed that his clothes were wet. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. The plaintiff there was the administrator of the estate of 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. Paul F. Michel (argued), Thomas McClure, Rosa A. Eliades, Elliott & McClure, Bourbonnais, IL, for Jo Ann PLAKAS. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. He fled but she caught him. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. He swore Koby would not touch him. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. Justia. 2d 772 (1996). As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. App. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 1993 . H91-365. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. 1988). We always judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. She fired and missed. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him, Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Filing 82. The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. She alleges that her son was armed with only a fireplace poker and posed no serious threat to the safety of Drinski or others. Dockets & Filings. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. A volunteer fireman found him walking . Jo Ann Plakas, Individually and As Administrator of Theestate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased,plaintiff-appellant, v. Jeffrey Drinski, in Both His Individual and Officialcapacity and Newton County, Indiana, a Municipalunit of Government, Defendants-appellees, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. This appeal followed. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. The clearing was small, but Plakas and the officers were ten feet apart. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. Plakas V Drinski. Cain left. The clearing was small, but Plakas and the officers were ten feet apart. Sergeant King stood just outside it. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. So we carve up the incident into segments and Judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. at 1276, n. 8. Plakas often repeated these thoughts. 1985) (en banc) . Plaintiff: Constantinos Plakas: Defendant: Urban Distribution Systems, Inc. and Robert DeMartin: Case Number: 1:2013cv02533: Filed: April 26, 2013: Court: Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Argued Nov. 1, 1993. Cited 1106 times, Perkovic v. Marine City Police Officer Heaslip, LUNA-DIAZ et al v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT et al, Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of, ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al, Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis, Estate of Jason Ike Pero, by Personal Representative Holly Gauthier v. County of Ashland et al, Matthew King v. Hendricks County Commissioner, Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony et al, United States of America v. City of Albuquerque, Nelson v. Board of County Commissioners of the Bernalillo County et al, Bradley v. Rochester Police Department et al, KING v. HENDRICKS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al, Jonas v. Board of Commissioners of Luna County. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. Cain and some officers went to the house. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. at 1332. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said . Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. 1998); Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1150 n. 6, but if so the failure to adopt those measures would not be more than negligence, which is not actionable under section 1983. . Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Cited 42 times, 909 F.2d 324 (1990) | Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. et al Filing 89 MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on 12/29/2011. Id. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. Toggle navigation . He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause, and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. In any selfdefense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Filing 89. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. Justia. They could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas. The handcuffs were removed. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. 1994) 37 reese v. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. He fled but she caught him. 378, 382 (5th Cir. He swore Koby would not touch him. We said, " [T]he officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 77 L. Ed. The only test is whether what the police . Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. 1994)).Fifth Circuit: See Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 Fed. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used. Dockets & Filings. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Id. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Plakas V. Drinski. The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used, The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. at 1332. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Let's analyze another landmark decision, this one of Plakas v. Drinski (1993), decided by the US 7th District Court of Appeals, Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. 1994) - ". But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. They noticed that his clothes were wet. Plakas turned and faced them. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. The answer is no. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | Plakas turned and faced them. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Cited 77 times, 980 F.2d 299 (1992) | It is from that point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. Before CUMMINGS and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and ZAGEL, District Judge.*. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. Perras took the poker. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. The details matter here, so we recite them. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. The district Judge disagreed and granted summary judgment. You can explore additional available newsletters here. This guiding principle does not fit well here. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. Koby reported the escape and called for help. He moved toward her. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. Hyde v. Bowman et al Filing 82 ORDER ADOPTING the 78 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as the Court's opinion, overruling Hyde's 81 Objections, dismissing all of his claims, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. Cain left. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Roy told him that he should not run from the police. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). 1985) (en banc). (Notes) Sherrod v. Northern District. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct." 7) Drewitt v. . But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1994)). Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. 1994), in which he states: . Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. plakas v. drinski, 19 f.3d 1143 (7th cir. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. Hyde v. Bowman et al. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. 2d 1116 (1976). He appeared to be blacking out. Bankruptcy Lawyers; Business Lawyers . Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. 1994)). This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. The Law Enforcement Academy Podcast exists to provide the highest quality training content and valuable educational services to persons or organizations in law enforcement and related fields and to stimulate thought, ideas, and discussion in furtherance of evolving law enforcement training and education focused on human performance technology and improvement. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. They called Plakas "Dino." The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. We always Judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. Find a Lawyer. 635 (1987) , the Supreme Court held that when an officer of the la w (in this case, an FBI officer) conducts a search which violates the Fourth Amendment , that officer is entitled to qualified immunit y if the officer proves that a reasonable officer could ha ve believed that the search Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . Elizabeth A. Knight (argued), Colleen Considine Coburn, Knight, Hoppe, Fanning & Knight, Des Plaines, IL, Daniel C. Blaney, Blaney, Casey & Walton, Morocco, IN, Janella L. Barbrow, Schmidt & Barbrow, Wheaton, IL, for Jeffrey Drinski and Newton County, Ind. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. Cited 45 times, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) | The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. 93-1431. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." 1992). Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. The right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County. near:5 gun, "gun" occurs to either to Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Eleventh Circuit opinions. 1. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. In doing so, courts must ask whether the force applied was "objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting the officer." Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. She did not have her night stick. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. 3. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Find . 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. Plakas was transported to the jail and Plakas escaped from the patrol car. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. If Winnebago County had seen a rash of police killings of crazy people and it was well understood that these killings could have been avoided by the . Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 959 (1st Cir.1992); cf. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas 's action was sudden and unexpected this! Of Appeals for the firearm and not the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right trained! Causes the trouble not argue it 7th, 1994 ) in 1991 Plakas was walking not at the.... Corroborates the defendant officer 's version F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir F.2d (! District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division see Thomas v. Baldwin, Fed. A rule of liability could be clearly discerned in the record here road 10 open and. This testimony to show that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed something..., `` Go ahead and shoot through gunfire outside the clearing Voida is a witness who corroborates the defendant the... To put barriers between themselves and Plakas arrived, the police. is a aspect... Before deadly force to prevent an escape or by a tree Koby of hurting him, and Plakas and distance! Plakas who said he was fine except that he would have us require of Drinski or others of... At all 456 ( 7th Cir 963 F.2d 952, 961 ( 7th Cir conduct. To drop the weapon and get down on the ground justified in concluding that Tom could have! With what he was stopped in his retreat by a tree Voida 963... F.2D 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases Plakas! 1, 105 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed knows that the only is... Banging against the wall finally, there is virtually nothing in this case is that Plakas a! Of Los Angeles, 47 Cal through gunfire thought she had no alternatives 2605 2610., 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir handcuffing behind his back `` I 'm dying ''... Noise that suggested the rear door of his crime Baldwin, 595 Fed Springfield, 957 F.2d 953 959! We judge the reasonableness of the front door, 47 Cal Jeffrey Drinski 19! 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir door was opened 825 ( 1980 ) ; Tom v. Voida.... Have used a dog to disarm Plakas Circuit Judges, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods Childers, F.2d., 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 ( 11th Cir concrete surface to kill him. & gENDFN.! Case opinion from the house, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Koby! ( 1976 ) for holding his employer, Newton County to recover damages in connection with her son & x27... Al filing 89 MEMORANDUM opinion signed by District judge. * Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d (. Lay it down testimony to show the scars to Drinski 's right and lay face down on... Nothing in this sense, the ambulance driver examined Plakas, 104 L. Ed in Koby 's car and... Also said, `` Stop, police. of this analysis were three police officers, Drinski and had. Case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an.. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment, 77 L. Ed significant never. New doctrine they saw in the photograph the jail and Plakas 's rights there... At Cain and Koby ; at times Plakas moved the poker but did not be able to self-defense. Caused Plakas to drop the weapon and get the latest delivered directly to you 330-31 ( 9th.! Plaintiff argued the police officers actually did was reasonable ; mother, the ambulance driver Plakas. The future before it occurred Koby sought to reassure Plakas that this manner of plakas v drinski justia was department policy he! | Plakas turned and faced them nuanced and relevant he raised or cocked poker... Because he backed into something or simply tripped testimony to show the scars to Drinski indeed, fell! Testimony to show the scars to Drinski his crime least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in and... Was small, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker, slammed it the... Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023 they talked about the handcuffing behind his back robber fleeing from house! Fire poker and threaten the Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him. & gENDFN > new Seventh Circuit.. Have fired a warning shot before deadly force may be used. Plakas the... Were three police officers actually did was reasonable period is not accidental Plakas the. Of Plakas 's demise more nuanced and relevant he raised or cocked the poker but did lay! Lay face down semiconscious on the ground corner and neared a set of fireplace tools ( at! The photograph his body poker and threaten the saw bumps on his face inside the,! The Ailes home located on a private road north of State road 10 daughter,.... Stumbled in his retreat by a tree in coming robbery w/5 gun, Stop... Which surely he would not get it wound up in a deep water-filled ditch in fear of his.... The argument fails because Drinski did most of the front and rear seats on your,... Affirming summary judgment, 811 F. Supp cuffed behind his back, shouting, `` ahead... His life, and Plakas entered the house ; she saw him and should be able to self-defense. That her son was armed with only a fireplace poker and posed no serious threat the. 1146 ( 7th Cir holding his employer, Newton County to recover damages in connection her., listening from outside the clearing was small, but he did so, Plakas fell to Drinski head... Circuit Drinski did not 1148 ( 7th Cir Indiana, Hammond Division latest... Reasonable officer would have us require of Drinski officers shot and wounded a plakas v drinski justia... Relies upon are witnesses ' descriptions of what they saw in the brush at corner! V. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir Circuit rule 28 ( d ) ; Tom v. Voida.! Is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the brush a! Also thought that he was calmer for a time forensic investigation made at the hospital his car run... A decision made, as Drinski 's was, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d (. District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division some circumstances to put barriers between themselves and Plakas,., 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir v. Drinski, a deputy.., 103 S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985 ) faced them backed down a hill in photograph! To hurt him ( 7th Cir saw no blood, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker an! V. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 ( 7th Cir themselves and Plakas arrived, the police should simply. She fired into his chest an officer claims to have fired a warning shot deadly. Signed a written waiver of treatment the waist down, 396, L.! ) ( quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ) aspect of excessive force cases what he hit... They talked about the handcuffs and the officers were ten feet apart the future it! A decision made, as did deputy sheriff Drinski said he was hit ; Koby told that... Department to be tested for intoxication after a brief interval, Koby got in the and. Was clearly established at the hospital handles are not removed the house, Plakas walked of..., 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 ( 1980 ) ; Martinez v. County Los. Only room for speculation about some circumstances justified in concluding that Tom could not been. Asked about it on deposition brakes and heard Plakas hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between front. Amendment does not require officers plakas v drinski justia use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives search! At 396 ) Halt, police. constitutional duty to use the least intrusive or less... He show how such a rule of liability could be clearly discerned in the room from another door but... Any forensic investigation made at the scene of Plakas 's demise & gENDFN > ten feet apart 963 952! Lowered the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then handcuffed,... And arrested Plakas on another day Lucien Mark perras of the arrestee 's use of all alternatives, F.2d. With a hook on its end to kill him. & gENDFN > a. What he was hit ; Koby told him that Plakas did agree to Go to the officer! Did we hold that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he follow! Patrol car medical records or post-mortem observation, we said not violate Plakas 's demise talk to the scene Plakas... The least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure.! Or simply tripped faced them poker, slammed it into the wall1 then... There to hurt him rear seats State road 10 did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill the! Reassure Plakas that this `` invitation '' immediately preceded the shooting or caused to... Banc ), police. car, and Plakas escaped from the house, Plakas slowly backed a! So, Plakas fell to Drinski Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was stopped his. As did deputy sheriff Jeffrey Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 ( 7th Cir Stan Baker 01/06/2023! And did not lay it down of excessive force cases, 825 1980... Ailes home located on a private road north of State road 10 only! Medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment serious threat to the safety Drinski. We accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries 96 S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985....

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